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Dear Sir, 
 
 
Submission on the Traditional Courts Bill (B1-2012) 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
The LRG submission describes 6 key problem areas with the Traditional Courts Bill.  Of 
particular concern is that only one of the rural interest groups directly affected by the Bill is 
recorded as having been consulted during the drafting process: traditional leaders.  In 
consequence the Bill overtly privileges the interests of traditional leaders over those of other 
rural residents, in particular rural women.   
 
In essence, we argue that the motivation of the drafters to enhance the powers of traditional 
leaders has resulted in a Bill that is inconsistent with customary precedents and would 
undermine the intrinsic character and accountability of existing customary dispute resolution 
processes.  Thus, instead of suggesting amendments to specific provisions we recommend 
that the consultation process be broadened to include the constituency directly affected by the 
Bill. Moreover, the current Bill is inappropriate as a starting point for such discussions. The 
starting point has to be the way in which customary courts currently function and how this 
can be enhanced, supported and improved.   
 
Our submission is divided into 2 parts. The first outlines the problems with the current Bill. 
The next focuses on developing an alternative approach more in keeping with the character 
and dynamics of current indigenous dispute resolution processes.  The first half of part B, 
drawing on extensive research, describes the key features of existing customary courts 
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explaining how the TCB would undermine these.  The latter half of part B then sets out an 
alternative framework that would address the problems with the current Bill. 
 
In conclusion, we argue that the current Bill is fatally flawed and should be withdrawn, and a 
proper consultation process embarked on to ascertain the views and experiences of a proper 
cross-section of ordinary rural people, paying particular care to enable rural women to 
participate fully. 
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4 
Introduction 
 
The Law, Race and Gender (LRG) Research Unit was established in 1994 as a research and 
training unit in UCT’s Faculty of Law.  Presently, the main project of LRG is the Rural 
Women’s Action-Research (RWAR) project.  The RWAR project is part of a wider 
collaborative initiative that seeks to support struggles for change by rural people, particularly 
women, in South Africa.  The project focuses on land rights, but includes related issues of 
poverty, inheritance, succession, marriage, women’s standing and representation in 
community structures and before traditional courts, rural governance, citizenship and access 
to human rights in general by rural women.  An explicit concern is that of power relations, 
and the impact of national laws and policy in framing the balance of power within which 
rural women and men struggle for change at the local level.  The RWAR project seeks to 
understand the complexities and opportunities in the processes of contestation and change 
underway in rural areas and aims to provide targeted forms of support to those engaged in 
struggles that challenge patriarchal and autocratic power relations in former homeland areas. 
 
In that context, LRG is concerned that the legislation regulating customary courts be 
appropriate.  We agree that customary courts play an important role, that the Black 
Administration Act provisions are inappropriate and that a new legislative and regulatory 
framework is required. Moreover, based on reports coming from members of rural 
communities throughout the country, there is the need for legislative intervention to restore 
the indigenous accountability mechanisms that were undermined by apartheid legislation and 
perpetuated by more recent statutes.  LRG’s informed view is that the Traditional Courts Bill 
B1-2012 (hereinafter, the Bill or TCB) will not serve the function of democratising, 
protecting and supporting ordinary rural people in their pursuits of justice and attempts to 
gain legal and socio-economic security.   
 
Therefore, while LRG embraces government pronouncements that the reintroduction of the 
Bill in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) is to ensure that rural consultations are 
conducted on the Bill, we regret that the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development has disregarded warnings that the TCB is based on too flawed a framework to 
be made constitutional by mere adaptation.  Put differently, we maintain (as we have 
repeatedly alerted the Department and Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constiututional 
Development) that the best chance of making the TCB conform with the Constitution and 
living customary law is to start afresh in drafting legislation based on (i) the views of 
ordinary rural people and (ii) a framework that does not rely on apartheid boundaries and 
precedents. 
 
The Bill seeks to regulate the customary courts that operate in communal areas and bring 
them in line with the Constitution.  However, in adopting a model that is very much in 
keeping with the centralised and patriarchal framework that the Black Administration Act 38 
of 1927 and Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951 ingrained, it rather entrenches the flaws that 
these courts developed under apartheid.  
 
Customary law continues to play an important role in the lives of many of the 17 million 
South Africans living in rural areas.  Hence, traditional courts – as the structures that 
primarily administer justice in those contexts – retain an important role, as the first ports of 
call in many places.  In some areas, they work well; while in others they are dysfunctional.  
Part of the problem is the inconsistency in their operation: not necessarily because they take 
different forms in different settings but because of insufficient accountability and oversight to 
ensure that, where they are dysfunctional, they can be remedied and improved.  Indeed, even 
in the places where they do work, there is a need for greater resources and support for them.  
This is what the TCB is meant to do, but fails to achieve. 
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Unfortunately, the Bill reflects inadequate appreciation for the real life experiences of the 
people on the ground.  The Memorandum to the Bill acknowledges that it was drafted in 
collaboration with the National House of Traditional Leaders and in consultation with only 
traditional leaders.  It disregards most of the recommendations made by the South African 
Law Reform Commission (hereinafter, SALRC), which consulted extensively with diverse 
sectors of society, including women.  
 
The main problems with the TCB may be summarised as follows. 
 
1. Consultation on the Bill’s content was unequal; 
2. Power is centralised to a ‘senior traditional leader’, hence living customary law is 
distorted; 
3. Choice is denied in that opting out of the jurisdiction of a traditional court is not 
permitted and people living in the former homelands are forcibly ‘subjected’ to 
traditional authority according to apartheid-defined jurisdictional boundaries; 
4. The proposed substantive jurisdiction of the courts is very broad while the protections 
afforded to parties are limited; and, traditional leaders are granted unaccountable 
powers to impose highly coercive sanctions and the ability of parties to appeal or 
review their decisions is limited; 
5. Gender inequalities are not improved, but rather exacerbated; 
6. The Bill is therefore arguably unconstitutional. 
 
These concerns are detailed below (part A). 
 
In light of the listed problems with the Bill, LRG maintains that the only way forward is for 
the TCB as currently worded to be withdrawn and replaced with legislation based on a 
framework that fully accommodates the well-documented practices of local communities.  
Such a framework is proposed in the last part of this submission (part B).  Our argument is 
legislation as important as this should be drafted in light of extensive consultation with 
affected rural communities. 
 
 
A. Problems 
 
 
1. Unequal consultation on the Bill’s content 
 
By the Department’s own admission in the Memorandum to the TCB, the Bill was drafted on 
the basis of consultation with traditional leaders, almost exclusively. Ordinary rural people 
were not consulted. Of the 17 million South Africans living in rural areas, traditional leaders 
form a small minority and are almost all male. This means that they are limited in their ability 
to accurately or fully represent the interests of the ordinary people who live under traditional 
authority. Moreover, they clearly have an interest in the content of the TCB and the powers 
that it grants them relative to their people that would make it difficult for them to represent 
rural people’s interests objectively vis-à-vis their own. 
 
We draw the Select Committee’s attention to the fact that women and children make up the 
overwhelming majority of people living in the former homeland areas, and often find 
themselves in a vulnerable position in relation to adult male-dominated traditional 
institutions.  Women face particular problems in customary courts and are therefore the 
people most adversely affected by the Bill’s failings. The problems with the Bill that are set 
out below reflect the exclusion of women’s voices and experiences from the drafting process. 
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By contrast, the SALRC conducted a more inclusive process of consultation.  It heard from 
not only traditional leaders at national and provincial level – i.e. people who make up the 
very institutions at issue – but also ordinary people from diverse quarters, albeit that it did not 
reach all sections of society.  The SALRC paid particular attention to the needs and 
difficulties encountered by women. We strongly encourage the Select Committee to ensure 
that ordinary rural women – i.e. not just women who form part of formal institutions like 
traditional councils – are separately consulted as a specific interest group, in circumstances 
that address the inherent problem of unequal power relations in rural areas.  Women cannot 
be expected to be able to speak freely about problems with traditional leaders in the presence 
of those leaders.  
 
 
2. Power is centralised to a ‘senior traditional leader’, hence living customary law is 
distorted 
 
The Traditional Courts Bill centralises power to the ‘senior traditional leader’ in a manner 
that is inconsistent with ‘living customary law’. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held 
that customary law is the ‘living law’ developed by the people through their practice.1 This is 
inconsistent with a single individual being empowered to determine the content of customary 
unilaterally.  
 
The TCB fails to recognise the important role played by councillors in current dispute 
resolution processes.  The Bill provides no specific role or function for the councillors who, 
in practice, are the bedrock of the system.  Instead, it focuses all power and responsibility in 
the presiding officer.  This is contrary to the operation of the traditional justice system in real 
life where the councils, along with the senior traditional leader, actually constitute the 
traditional court, providing for significant participation by ordinary members of the 
community.   
 
The so-called presiding officer is a ‘senior traditional leader’.  This disregards the fact that 
(ordinary) family courts are a legitimate part of the traditional court system.  The only 
persons to whom the senior traditional leader may – by the Minister’s written approval – 
delegate his/her responsibilities, in terms of section 4(4), is a headman, headwoman or 
member of the royal family – and only when s/he is absent.  The Bill thus turns the traditional 
courts into an elite establishment in a manner contrary to practice, including practice as 
recorded by the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC). The Bill simply fails to 
recognise the full range of traditional courts that currently operate – family, clan, ward, 
village councils and meetings.  Traditional leaders themselves say that this failure to 
(specifically) recognise lower level courts is inconsistent with customary law. (2003 Report, 
p.9 and Contralesa website as at 27 April 2010) 
 
From the TCB’s one substantive reference to ‘traditional councils’ in relation to the auditing 
of traditional courts’ records, one might assume that the traditional councils created by the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 (TLGFA) could be the 
structures that act as traditional courts. However, this is not substantiated by anything else in 
the Bill contributing to ambiguity and lack of clarity. Moreover, if the implication is that 
officially established traditional councils will, in all instances, form the councils of traditional 
                                                
1 Alexkor Ltd and Another v the Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC); Bhe and Others v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); Shilubana and Others v 
Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) and Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 (3) 
BCLR 243 (CC) 
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courts, a further range of problems is created. Some areas have established a TLGFA council 
that is, in fact, separate from embedded and active traditional institutions, which persist 
alongside it: traditional dispute-hearing amabandla are, in many areas, among pre-existing 
and co-existing traditional forums and institutions.  The assumption that the TLGFA council 
will serve as the ultimate traditional court in all communities is inconsistent with current 
reality.  Recognition should instead be accorded to the existing amabandla that hear disputes 
(unrelated to the TLGFA councils) existing at multiple levels of the community. These bodies 
are constituted by active parties beyond the senior traditional leader and manifest the 
inclusive nature of customary forums that can include any (male) member of the community. 
 
The Bill’s exclusion of the involvement of ordinary members of the community who would 
ordinarily participate in the hearing and resolution of traditional court cases silences 
countervailing voices.  It therefore undermines the development of a living customary law 
that reflects all the different voices currently involved in dispute resolution and in debates 
about the content and interpretation of changing customs and practices, instead of 
encouraging it. 
 
There are indications that decentralised power enables women greater possibilities for 
influencing the living customary law (i.e. customary law as it exists and develops in practice 
on the ground).  While women and children are often denied voice under patriarchal 
traditional structures, they are more empowered to express their voice by being able to 
exploit the opportunities provided by diverse forums and processes of change underway in 
the context of a fluid, living customary law.  The centralisation of power to traditional leaders 
without providing ordinary people with sufficient protections or agency in the TCB will serve 
to close down the few avenues that women have for improving their circumstances and 
obtaining greater security for themselves within community structures.  The Bill’s present 
formulation even precludes strong women councillors from emerging through participation 
and experience in co-existing decentralised dispute resolution forums.  
 
As a matter of comparison, the SALRC recommended the recognition of the potential 
contribution of respected councillors (male or female) who emerge organically from within 
communities at its lower hierarchical levels and have a proven track record of resolving 
disputes in a customary setting.  It noted that  
 
‘in most cases the chief will not normally preside over the proceedings.  A trusted 
councillor will be appointed to preside.  The chief is briefed about the proceedings 
and will not normally differ from the general view of his councillors.’ (2003 Report, 
pp.6-7) 
 
The SALRC also observed that: 
 
‘in many traditional communities the practice is that claims or complaints start at the 
level of the family council.   If a matter is not resolved at that level it is taken to the 
headman who together with his advisors, attempts to dispose of the matter.  If it is still 
not resolved, the matter is taken on appeal to the chief.’ (2003 Report, p.5, and section 
3 of the SALRC draft bill) 
 
Hence, the SALRC’s draft bill provided for appeals, within the community’s multileveled 
traditional courts system as well as in relation to the state courts system.  (Section 27 of the 
SALRC draft bill)  The TCB is very different.  It makes no provision for the significant role 
played by community members and councillors (at multiple levels) and instead centralises all 
decision-making powers to the ‘senior traditional leader’, thereby distorting custom in the 
ways outlined below. 
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It also does not give expression to the SALRC’s conclusion that ‘it was generally agreed that 
popular participation was a cornerstone of the traditional system of justice.’ (2003 Report, p. 
19)  By this omission, it also disadvantages women because the vast majority of senior 
traditional leaders are men.  It ignores the SALRC’s recommendation that women’s 
representation in the councils that hear and decide disputes be guaranteed by law. (2003 
Report, p.8, and section 4 of the SALRC draft bill) 
 
 
3. Choice denied and rural people forcibly subjected to former homeland jurisdictional 
boundaries 
 
The TCB denies rural inhabitants the entitlement to choose their forum by preventing them 
from opting out of their local traditional courts’ jurisdictions.  In section 20(c), it makes it an 
offence for anyone within the jurisdiction of a traditional court, even a passer-by, not to 
appear before it if summoned. This contradicts the SALRC’s recommendation that people be 
permitted to opt out of traditional court jurisdictions in appreciation of ‘the controversy 
surrounding the issue of the independence and impartiality of customary courts’. (2003 
Report, p.32, and sections 28(1), (5) and (6) of the SALRC draft bill)  Instead, the TCB 
supports traditional leaders’ arguments that allowing people to opt out would undermine their 
authority. (See 2003 Report, p.32) But it must be remembered that the jurisdictional authority 
and boundaries imposed by the TCB are those established by the Black Administration Act, 
1927 and Black Authorities Act, 1951.   
 
The jurisdictional boundaries of the traditional courts envisioned by the TCB rely on those of 
traditional leaders and traditional communities, as demarcated by the Traditional Leadership 
and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 (TLGFA). The TLGFA, however, simply 
resuscitates old apartheid boundaries. 
 
Section 28(1) of the TLGFA states the following:  
 
Any traditional leader who was appointed as such in terms of applicable 
provincial legislation and was still recognised as a traditional leader immediately 
before the commencement of this Act, is deemed to have been recognised as such 
in terms of section 9 or 11, subject to a decision of the ommission in terms of 
section 26. 
Section 28(3) goes on to deem any  ‘“tribe” that, immediately before the commencement of 
this Act, had been established and was still recognised as such is deemed to be a traditional 
community contemplated in section 2 … .’  Section 28(4) continues in this same vein, stating 
that any ‘tribal authority that, immediately before the commencement of this Act, had been 
established and was still recognised as such, is deemed to be a traditional council … .’ 
 
In Tongoane and Others v Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs and Others,2 then Chief 
Justice Ngcobo noted that: 
 
The Black Authorities Act gave the State President the authority to establish 
“with due regard to native law and custom” tribal authorities for African “tribes” 
as the basic unit of administration in the areas to which the provisions of [the 
Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 (CLARA)] apply. … It is these tribal 
authorities that have now been transformed into traditional councils for the 
                                                
2 CCT 100-09, judgment delivered on 11 May 2010, at para 24 
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purposes of section 28(4) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act, 2003 (the Traditional Leadership Act). And in terms of section 
21 of CLARA, these traditional councils may exercise powers and perform 
functions relating to the administration of communal land. (emphasis added) 
The Court finally declares that ‘[u]nder apartheid, these steps were a necessary prelude to the 
assignment of African people to ethnically-based homelands.’3  It is difficult to see how such 
an undemocratic process can acquire different (that is, democratic) significance in the present 
but this is what is entrenched by the TLGFA in combination with the  Traditional Courts Bill. 
 
Currently, under the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 system, opting out is possible; the 
TCB therefore changes current law and practice by outlawing opting out.  The Bill also 
hereby violates the consensual character of customary law.   
 
It is inadequate for the Department of Justice to say – as it did in its briefing to the National 
Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development – that people 
consent at the stage of entering the community and choosing to live in the traditional 
authority’s jurisdiction.  For a start, it is commonly known that scarcely any rural inhabitants 
have the luxury of choosing where they are going to live, nor the resources to move should 
they be unhappy with their living situation.   
 
Secondly, it is worth recalling that the government itself is in the process of addressing land 
and chieftaincy claims that are based on the recognition of the apartheid history that resulted 
in people’s being dispossessed of their land, forcibly removed from their homes and 
relocated, and then also placed under the authority and stewardship of chiefs who were not 
their own, who observe different cultures to their own.  The government thus acknowledges, 
and has done many times, the need to investigate and weed out the illegitimate traditional 
leaders and boundaries created by apartheid through attempts such as the Ralushai and 
Nhlapo commissions.  Unfortunately, the Nhlapo commission report dealt only with 
paramountcies and investigations concerning senior traditional leaders and traditional 
communities have yet to be conducted eight years after the Commission was established in 
terms of the TLGFA.  
 
Thirdly, because the TCB entrenches former apartheid homeland boundaries established by 
the Black Authorities Act of 1951, people do not have the opportunity to choose whether they 
want to fall under a particular traditional leader’s authority and law – this is imposed upon 
communities, even those who are presently contesting the existing apartheid boundaries and 
imposed cultural affiliations. 
 
It is important to note that there is evidence to suggest that having diverse dispute resolution 
forums from which to choose increases the accountability of traditional courts by permitting 
people to avoid certain courts if they are thought to be illegitimate, or known to be biased. 
The converse of this is that, where traditional courts are functional and just, people choose to 
turn to them and rely upon them for the enforcement of justice and order; the functionality of 
the courts therefore is what secures their authority.   
 
In the way in which it is practiced, living customary law permits people to choose their forum 
according to their needs and where they expect that they will obtain a just hearing.  People’s 
choosing not to attend a particular traditional court does not mean that they escape the law; it 
means that they go to a different forum to have it enforced.  This is one of the freedoms 
bestowed upon South African citizens by the Constitution: living in a plural society with a 
                                                
3 Tongonae, para 25 
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pluralist legal order where people can choose how they wish to live.  The Bill effectively 
establishes a separate legal regime for those living in the former homelands, dividing South 
Africans once again by apartheid geography 
 
 
4. Broad powers, limited accountability 
 
The proposed substantive jurisdiction of the courts, set out in sections 5(1) and 6 of the TCB, 
is very broad while the protections afforded to parties that would come before them are 
limited. Morevoer, traditional leaders are granted unaccountable powers to impose highly 
coercive sanctions while the ability of parties to appeal or review their decisions would be 
limited.  In our view such coercive powers are inconsistent with the nature of living 
customary law.  
 
The substantive jurisdiction that is proposed for traditional courts is extremely broad in that it 
is defined in the negative (i.e. by only excluding areas concerning which they cannot resolve 
disputes). Also, while constitutional matters are purportedly excluded by section 5(2)(a) of 
the Bill, it would be impossible for traditional courts to avoid considering matters of 
constitutional import if they are required to comply with the guiding principles set out with 
reference to the Constitution in section 3. Given that it is unavoidable that the courts will deal 
with constitutional matters it is very serious that some decisions of traditional courts would 
escape appeal or review. It is similarly very serious that people should not be able to choose 
whether they want matters having such implications resolved in traditional or state courts, 
especially since traditional courts do not possess constitutional expertise. 
 
Having centralised power to the individual senior traditional leader and granted him broad 
substantive jurisdiction, the TCB extends this individual’s powers to allow him to determine 
and impose heavy sanctions.  The sanctions available are, in the first place, inconsistent with 
what the Bill suggests is a non-punitive and, instead, restorative system of dispute resolution. 
They are coercive whereas restorative justice does not comport with coercive sanctions.  
 
Moreover, certain of the sanctions provided for by the TCB are controversial because of the 
nature of the far-reaching and unaccountable powers they provide to traditional leaders; for 
example, according to section 10(2)(g) the traditional court may issue: 
 
“an order that one of the parties to the dispute, both parties or any other person 
performs some form of service without remuneration for the benefit of the community 
under the supervision or control of a specified person or group of persons identified 
by the traditional court”. 
 
This provision permits that even a person who is not a party to the dispute before the court 
can be ordered to provide ‘free labour’.  In light of most people in the rural areas being 
women and children, who already bear the brunt of manual labour, this work is likely to fall 
on their shoulders.  Moreover, the persons most likely to benefit from the ‘free labour’, are 
the traditional leaders, who publicly claim that it is customary for their ‘subjects’ to provide 
labour in the ‘fields of the realm’ and royal kraal.   
 
The SALRC prescribed that: 
 
“a person convicted of an offence before a customary court may be sentenced to 
community service under the supervision of the traditional authority in whose area of 
jurisdiction the offence was committed, for a period not exceeding three months: 
Provided that community service shall not include service on the personal property of 
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a traditional leader or other public official.” (Section 23 of the SALRC draft bill; 
emphasis added)   
 
These important limitations are absent from the TCB.   
 
The SALRC draft bill sought to provide protections in cases of abuses by traditional leaders 
and councillors serving as the traditional courts.  Sections 20 and 28(6) of the SALRC draft 
bill provided for sanctions against traditional court members who acted contrary to the bill.  
Amongst these sanctions, it provided for imprisonment and fines: for accepting bribes and 
hearing matters not permitted by the draft bill, respectively.   
 
By contrast, looking at its terms, the TCB seems primarily concerned with consolidating the 
powers of senior traditional leaders acting as traditional courts, attributing extensive powers 
to them without providing matching degrees of accountability or constraint on them. While 
the TCB provides for sanctions against contravening traditional leaders, it defers their details 
to the TLGFA.  (This legislation has already been described as a problematic reference point 
for traditional courts because they are not necessarily the same structures as the traditional 
councils formed in terms of the TLGFA).  It does not make provisions for either conviction 
or fines against traditional leaders although, in the case of fines, these are levied against 
members of the community who appear before the courts, who are less able to pay them. 
 
In light of women’s vulnerability to eviction, the 1999 Commission for Gender Equality / 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies / National Land Committee submission to the SALRC 
raised serious concerns about disputes concerning land rights coming before traditional 
leaders who have the ‘executive’ role of administering and allocating land, on the one hand, 
overlapping with their power to decide disputes about land rights, on the other.  Discounting 
such concerns, section 10(2)(i) authorises traditional courts to deprive defendants of benefits 
that accrue in terms of customary law and custom.  Customary entitlements to land are one 
such benefit; community membership is another.  Even though section 10(1) limits the 
traditional court’s right to impose banishment in criminal matters, there is no such limitation 
in respect of civil disputes.  Effectively, therefore, traditional courts are permitted to revoke 
people’s customary rights to land, and strip them of their community membership.  All of this 
is consistent with the powers that the apartheid government gave traditional leaders under the 
homeland system but is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights that applies equally to all South 
Africans. 
 
Recent studies have shown that levying practices continue and are widespread4 despite the 
fact that there is a strong argument that the Constitution does not permit levying by 
traditional institutions.5 ‘Tribal levies’ include annual taxes, as well as ad hoc levies.  Such ad 
hoc levies might be for the maintenance of the chief  – for instance, to purchase a car for the 
                                                
4 See (July 2009) Draft Report on the Consultative Process on Communal Contributions Paid in Traditional 
Communities Within KwaZulu-Natal, Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit, UKZN 
5 The Constitution (in sections 43 and 104) vests powers of this kind in national and provincial government 
only, and permits provinces to delegate only to their municipalities, as per section 104(1)(c).  Chapter 13 of the 
Constitution, which (in sections 226 through 230A) deals specifically with ‘Provincial and Local Financial 
Matters’, anticipates that revenue will be raised only by national, provincial and local government.  Strict 
procedures are put in place by the Constitution for Money Bills in section 228(2)(b) to check the provincial 
power of taxation:  
 
The power of a provincial legislature to impose taxes, levies, duties and surcharges — … 
(b) must be regulated in terms of an Act of Parliament, which may be enacted only after any 
recommendations of the Financial and Fiscal Commission have been considered. 
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chief, or a traditional skirt for his wife, or even to send his children to school.  The latter 
category of taxes is difficult to dissociate from the ‘special rates’ levied during colonialism 
and apartheid.6  Other ‘special’ rates include fines for cohabiting while unmarried, and for 
falling pregnant out of wedlock; levies for the removal of mourning clothes, and for hosting a 
traditional feast; and charges for obtaining proof of residence, and for obtaining an RDP 
house from government.  When people object and/or cannot pay these various taxes they are 
punished by being denied the proof of residence stamp that they need to obtain an identity 
document, open a bank account and function in the formal economy.  
 
Members of rural communities complain about this being double taxation (they pay VAT and 
then have to pay tribal levies).  They speak of finding ever-increasing and inflated tribal 
levies particularly burdensome in light of rural poverty and the desperate need for 
development rather than further extortion.  Women make up the majority of rural people 
(59% of the population of ‘tribal areas’ according to census data) and many of them are 
unemployed.  Yet they have no option but to pay expensive levies out of the child, disability 
or pension grants that they receive from government..   
 
The prevalence of the widespead pratice of extorting tribal levies that are inconsistent with 
the Constitution is but one indication of the unequal power relations in rural areas.  Instead of 
the Traditional Courts Bill providing mechanisms to address such abuse of power, it would 
further empower traditional leaders to enforce the payment of these illegal ‘tribal levies’.  
Some traditional courts refuse people access to courts if they are not ‘up to date’ with 
outstanding levies. The broad, coercive and unaccountable sanctioning powers assigned by 
the TCB would permit traditional courts to continue both the levying practices and the denial 
of access to justice to poor people who will not, or cannot afford to, pay such levies. Access, 
to a local traditional court can be construed as a customary benefit and denied as punishment 
in terms of the provisions of the Bill.  
 
The Bill provides no mechanisms to balance or debate a traditional leader’s determination of 
what constitutes customary law or his own powers under customary law.  Moreover the Bill 
limits the grounds for review and appeal of decisions made by the traditonal leader as 
presiding officer.  Thus aggrieved parties would have little scope for challenging a traditional 
leader’s decisions or imposed sanctions. The selection of which sanctions are appealable and 
which are not appears arbitrary. For example, of the two forms of compulsory labour that 
may be imposed, only one is appealable, labour for another party. Labour for the community 
at large, which is that most open to potential abuse, is unappealable.  Most serious is that the 
broad, general sanctioning provision at the end of the available list in section 10(2)(l), “any 
other order that the traditional court may deem appropriate and which is consistent with the 
provisions of this Act,” is unappealable.  
 
                                                
6 See Native Affairs Act 23 of 1920, Native Taxation and Development Act 41 of 1925, Bantu Authorities Act 
68 of 1951 and Bantu Taxation Act 92 of 1969 
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5. Gender inequalities are not improved, but rather exacerbated 
 
Section 9(3)(a) and (b) – Representation 
 
There are still many places where women are not allowed to appear before or address 
customary courts directly, instead they must be represented by male relatives.  This puts 
women at a severe disadvantage especially when the matter before the court concerns a 
marital or family dispute, or the status of the women’s rights vis-à-vis those of male relatives.  
Widows are at a severe disadvantage because women in mourning face particular restrictions 
in relation to entering court spaces.  A well-known problem is that of the eviction of widows 
arising out of disputes following the death of their husbands.  
 
Instead of directly addressing this serious problem, the TCB reinforces current patterns.  It 
does not provide explicitly that women should be allowed to represent themselves if they so 
choose; the TCB rather enables the continuation of gender-discriminatory practices in this 
regard.  Specifically, section 9(3)(a) bars people appearing before traditional courts from 
being represented by lawyers and section 9(3)(b) reads – 
 
“A party to proceedings before a traditional court may be represented by his or 
her wife or husband, family member, neighbour or member of the community, in 
accordance with customary law and custom.” (emphasis added) 
This is an example of formal equality that masks substantive inequality because it is unheard 
of for wives to represent their husbands in customary courts.  In terms of most ‘customary 
law and custom’ women must be represented by male relatives.  This puts women in a 
disadvantageous position if they are without adult male relatives, or if their relatives are the 
ones with whom they have the dispute.  In other words, the TCB reinforces the status quo of 
women being represented by men rather than protecting women and enabling them greater 
participation in traditional courts.   
 
Sections 5(2) and 9(2) – Exclusion of Matters of Women’s Status and Specific 
Protections for Women 
 
The composition of traditional courts and their patriarchal character tend to favour male 
interests and render women particularly vulnerable.  Consequently, when women present 
their particular concerns before the courts they are often at a disadvantage, and do not get a 
fair hearing, let alone a fair outcome.   
 
To remedy this, the 1999 CGE/CALS/NLC submission to the SALRC, for instance, 
recommended excluding all matters relating to the status of women from the jurisdiction of 
traditional courts.  They specifically recommended that matters relating to the following be 
excluded: 
 
• Violence against women and children (including rape, attempted rape, 
indecent assault, domestic violence and child abuse); 
• Guardianship and maintenance (including determination of paternity); and 
• Marriage (both civil and customary). 
 
Section 5(2) of the TCB does not pay these legitimate concerns much heed but rather consists 
of a relatively shorter list of exclusions.   
 
The Bill says, in section 9(2), that the presiding officer must ensure that the rights contained 
in the Bill of Rights are observed and respected, and in particular ‘that women are afforded 
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full and equal participation in the proceedings, as men are’.  This section must be read in light 
of the concern, explained above, that the Bill does not make any provision for the role of 
councillors in traditional courts and does not advance increased women’s representation on 
traditional court councils.  Therefore, this provision is limited to women as litigants and does 
nothing to encourage increased women’s representation in the constitution of traditional 
courts, or to improve their participation in other ways.   
 
Furthermore, whereas in practice, in many traditional courts, the senior traditional leader may 
be absent and decisions made by the council, the Bill places no responsibility to ensure 
women’s rights are protected on any other members of the court.   
 
Lastly, instead of the Bill providing specific protections for women to address the particular 
problems that they often face, the Bill puts the onus on the senior traditional leader to ensure 
the participation of women.  This means that rural women would have to challenge the 
actions of the senior traditional leader to invoke their rights – a daunting task, given 
prevailing power relations in rural areas. Moreover, according to the limited conditions of 
review set out in section 14(1), they would have to meet the high bar of showing that the 
traditional leader acted ‘ultra vires’, outside the scope of the Act, was guilty of a gross 
irregularity in the course of the proceedings, or was in some way partial, biased or malicious. 
 
 
6. The Bill is unconstitutional 
 
We have presented several arguments that the TCB is likely to be unconstitutional. We 
summarise these here. 
 
The terms of section 30 and 31 of the Bill of Rights and the general spirit of the Constitution 
are such that group rights cannot simply override individual rights. Section 30 specifically 
says that ‘everyone has the right … to participate in the cultural life of their choice’. Section 
31 is worded in such a way as to emphasise the rights of individuals forming a collective to 
choose ‘to enjoy their culture… and to form, join and maintain cultural … associations’. This 
provides a strong basis on which to argue that individuals could not simply, by virute of their 
residing in the former homelands, forfeit such rights to choose as the Constitution guarantees 
them. This is one basis upon which opting out of the jurisdiction of customary courts should 
be permitted. 
 
The fact that people are not permitted to have legal representation before customary courts 
(even in criminal matters), coupled with the fact that they are not permitted to opt out of the 
courts’ jurisdiction, creates a direct conflict with the Constitution.  Section 166(e) of the 
Constitution establishes the national courts.  The Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development has argued that customary courts are to be exempted from this section.  The 
Department says that customary courts are given recognition in terms of section 34, instead.7  
Note that section 34 and the forums it provides for are subject to the rest of the Bill of Rights 
and Constitution, such as section 35(3)(f), as are other courts and institutions.8  Also note that 
section 34 is a right primarily to have one’s case heard in a court as established in terms of 
section 166(e).9  Secondly, if it is deemed appropriate that the matter be heard in an 
                                                
7 See PMG report, http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20090901-department-justice-constitutional-development-
traditional-courts-bill 
8 See n 6 below 
9 See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) at paras 31-35; Giddey NO v JC Barnard and Partners 2007 
(5) SA 525 (CC) at para 15; Engelbrecht v Road Accident Fund and Another 2007 (6) SA 96 (CC) at paras 30 
and 40 
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alternative tribunal or forum, that alternative to the court must be independent and impartial 
in the way in which state courts are required to be.   
 
Customary courts generally are not independent and impartial; they therefore must exist 
outside of section 34.  Thus, if people are to use customary courts, they must use them as 
people use professional negotiators and arbitrators: by opting into them, specifically.  Put 
differently, if people are to make use of customary courts, people have to choose to abandon 
the forums required by sections 166(e) and 34.  They cannot be forced to use forums other 
than the state courts or comparable tribunals and forums. 
 
Furthermore, traditional institutions are not consistent with the separation of powers doctrine 
envisioned by the Constitution.. Traditional leaders allocate land and are eligible for a 
significant array of powers under section 20 of the TLGFA. The TCB would give them law- 
and decision-making powers as well. In other words, traditional leaders would have 
executive, legislative and judicial powers. We grant that judging customary law by the 
standards of the doctrine of separation of powers raises inherently complex dilemmas; 
however since the TCB entrenches distortions that undermine indigenous accountability 
mechanisms it cannot turn to customary law to shield it from the separation of powers 
doctrine. In effect, the current Bill shields traditional leaders from both indigenous 
accountability mechanisms and western ones.  In adopting the western ‘presiding officer’ 
court model at the expense of the layered and inclusive nature of customary dispute 
resolution mechanisms, the Bill loses any possible claim that traditional leaders should be 
exempt from the separation of powers doctrine.    
 
In accordance with the right to gender equality, section 8(1) which applies the Bill of Rights 
to all law and section 211(3) which subjects customary law to the Constitution, women are 
entitled to all of the same democratic rights as men. This means that, to the extent that men 
are permitted to represent themselves in cases under living customary law, women are 
entitled to the same. The TCB must specifically provide for this corrective articulation of 
customary law, in effect developing customary law as envisaged by sections 8(1), 8(3) and 
39(2) of the Constitution.  
 
Again, we reiterate the fact that the Constitutional Court has been unequivocal on the point 
that living customary law is what the Constitution protects as customary law. For instance, to 
the extent that the democratic participation of ordinary people under living customary law 
mechanisms of dispute resolution is removed by the TCB, the Bill falls foul of the  
Constitution which protects customary law as practiced and developed by the community that 
abides by it. To the extent that the Traditional Courts Bill is inconsistent with living 
customary law (as we have described in detail in this submission) and also inconsistent with 
the Constitution, it cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.                                                                                                                   
 
 
B. Proposed alternative framework 
 
 
1. Contextualising the alternative framework 
 
The first part of this submission has drawn attention to the problems with the TCB. The final 
part seeks to propose an alternative framework to that adopted by the TCB. It does so by 
focusing on three of the main areas of critique above: namely, the centralisation of law- and 
decision-making power to the traditional leader, the recognition of only one level of courts 
(the chief’s court) and the denial of the right to opt out of traditional courts’ jurisdiction. We 
detail the following vis-à-vis each of these:  
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(i) What do we know about the way customary courts actually function and how 
people use them?   
(ii) What are the implications of that for the regulatory framework that the 
Traditional Courts Bill adopts?   
 
We round off with a summary of what we suggest to be necessary aspects of a framework for 
successfully regulating customary courts. 
 
Our submission in this regard is based on recent ethnographic studies conducted by 
researchers at the Law, Race and Gender Research Unit (LRG) at the University of Cape 
Town. These confirm the findings from (a) a survey of 20th century ethnographies, (b) 20th 
century contestations brought to the civil courts to challenge state misinterpretations, 
distortions and impositions as well as (c) recent research and consultations conducted by the 
South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) in 1998-2003.  These sources are in basic 
consensus on key features of customary courts – which are ignore or undermined by the 
Traditional Courts Bill. 
 
Furthermore, a detailed study of the former statutes regulating this area (such as the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927 and the Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951), illustrates that the 
faulty approach adopted by the TCB is built on, and reflects, the architecture used by the 
apartheid government (and contested by communities themselves) and, in some cases, even 
modified or abandoned by the apartheid government due to its failure.  Some of the features 
and faults of the approach are listed below. 
 
Instead, we recommend legislation that is less interventionist and more democratic, that 
emphasises accountability to the community and is, hence, consistent with the Constitution 
and customary practices.  The underlying basis for the regulatory framework proposed is the 
notion that government must protect individual choice as the basis of both group identity and 
culture. Customary law is an inherently consensual system that derives its strength and 
vitality from the fact that people subscribe to it and choose to use it in their daily lives and 
dealings with one another. The essentially democratic and participatory nature of customary 
law is destroyed when it is imposed on people who do not choose to use it. This problem is 
reinforced when the jurisdictional areas of the court are not determined by self identification 
and affiliation but by contested apartheid boundaries.  We therefore argue that the recognition 
of customary law and courts must be contingent upon people being given the right to choose, 
or to opt out of the jurisdiction of, customary courts on the basis of their right to choose their 
own culture and identity. For group identities and arrangements to remain a viable choice, 
they must be supported and improved in ways that make them an attractive option. Moreover, 
people must be resourced with the necessary information and means to effect their choices, 
whether in favour of or away from the group and its social and institutional arrangements.   
 
Put differently, the Constitution requires that the agency and choices of individuals (including 
those living in the former homelands) be respected and supported.  At the same time, and in 
balance with this role, the state should assist in regulating and supporting customary dispute 
resolution forums that rural people use and value.  By the same token, the state retains the 
duty to capacitate individuals to choose effectively.  This duty on the state includes the need 
to reconceptualise formal laws and institutions so as to make them more accommodating of 
alternative contexts and realities, and thereby also make formal laws and institutions a more 
viable option for rural people who wish to use them. 
 
In terms of the mechanisms the law should use, this is summarised in a three-fold manner: (i) 
they should be lighter on assigning power to traditional institutions, (ii) heavier on assigning 
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them responsibility (tempered by an emphasis on the limitations of the powers assigned to 
them by apartheid), (iii) they should strengthen indigenous accountability mechanisms that 
make courts responsible, primarily, to the community the traditional court serves  and avoid 
the apartheid precedent of courts being accountable upwards to the state as opposed to 
downwards to their people.  Moreover, adequate state funding should be made available to 
cover their running costs, so that these are not extorted from rural people. 
 
  
a) Centralisation to the traditional leader as presiding officer 
 
i. What Do We Know about the Way Customary Courts Actually Function and How 
People Use Them? 
 
Customary courts are essentially non-professional institutions.  Rather, they are community 
forums in which mature members of the community participate.10  The notion of a presiding 
officer who acts as a judge and is the single decision-maker has no real place in these forums 
as they are shared discussion spaces in which all present can participate in the hearing, 
questioning, deliberation and decision.  Also, the variability between different communities 
(even within a single cultural group or locality) in the extent of the chief’s participation in the 
court – ranging from non-participation to active participation – makes the notion of presiding 
officer an untenable notion to adopt and impose on all communities.  The notion of a 
presiding officer, derived from western court systems, is misleading in the context of these 
forums.  Several studies detail that, even where the chief formulates and pronounces the 
decision in a customary court, he is bound by what the council and/or community has found 
in hearing that case.   
 
 
ii. What are the Implications of What We Know for the Regulatory Framework that 
the Traditional Courts Bill Adopts? 
 
By empowering a single actor as constituting the traditional court and having power to make 
law and decisions in traditional courts, the TCB centralises and professionalises the 
customary courts.  The TCB thereby violates the proven record of what is customary in the 
nature of customary courts – which is broad community involvement in all cases.11  The TCB 
also imposes this false model on all customary communities and thus undermines the 
localised nature and consequent variability between communities themselves and the 
functioning of their respective courts which allows for them to operate in a manner that meets 
the needs created by the communities’ immediate contexts. 
 
 
  
                                                
10 Women were traditionally excluded from participating in customary courts except in cultural systems where 
they had their own systems of courts (as in Pedi culture) or, as in the case of the Swazi, where the Queen would 
hear appeals in the court immediately beneath that of the King who was her son or where, as in the Lovhedu, a 
woman was the figurehead in the court, as chief. 
11 Yet, by failing to specifically provide for women in the constitution and operation of customary courts (except 
as litigants, and even then without the protections they need), the TCB reinforces the widespread problem with 
customary courts, which is women’s continued exclusion from them. 
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b) Recognising only chiefs’ courts 
 
i. What Do We Know about the Way Customary Courts Actually Function and How 
People Use Them? 
 
Customary courts do not and have never existed only at the chief’s court level.  Historically, 
colonial and apartheid governments have tried to ignore and even do away with the lower 
courts (family, clan and headmen’s courts) but failed.  These courts are embedded in the 
communities; they are often formed by members of the local communities meeting to, as they 
might say, ‘resolve problems’.  They do the bulk of the work of dispute resolution so that 
most cases do not even reach the chief’s court, which can be located far away from most 
community members.  Due to this, they are almost impossible to do away with and should 
form the core emphasis of any model of customary courts recognised by government.  The 
Black Administration Act had initially ignored them but, due to necessity, it was later 
amended so as to include their specific recognition, albeit inadequately still.  This was 
because – regardless of the Act’s ignoring these village and family courts – they continued to 
exist outside of the law. 
 
ii. What are the Implications of What We Know for the Regulatory Framework that 
the Traditional Courts Bill Adopts? 
 
By not recognising the courts at lower levels than the chief’s court, the TCB again centralises 
power to the chief in a way that is fundamentally inconsistent with customary practices.  It 
ignores the customary courts in which most administration of justice in customary 
communities in fact takes place.  It thereby effectively does away with an indispensible 
segment of customary forms of justice, which attempt has been proven over the last century 
and a half to be doomed to failure. 
 
c) Outlawing opting-out 
 
i. What Do We Know about the Way Customary Courts Actually Function and How 
People Use Them? 
 
Since the colonial and apartheid governments’ entrenching of patriarchy in traditional 
communities and the introduction of state courts alongside customary courts, the possibility 
of electing to avoid customary courts where they were unjust has served an important 
function (particularly for women).  People’s attendance of a particular customary court was 
always elective.  Thus people’s choice to recognise a particular court served the function of 
defining the customary court’s jurisdiction.  It was a show of the recognition of the 
legitimacy of a leader and served as an important check on the leader’s authority.  Indeed, it 
was also partly what made leaders lead well: they knew that if they did not rule justly or 
make fair decisions their people would defect.  This was only partly disrupted by apartheid 
legislation that forced limiting boundaries on people.  Yet, even with the existence of 
imposed jurisdictional boundaries for customary courts, the alternative system of courts made 
available to them (that is, the state court system) served as an important alternate 
accountability mechanism.  In other words, people would turn to the state courts to defend 
them against, or simply to avoid, their unjust rulers’ actions, laws and judgments.  In a 
modest but important way, this caused the customary courts to remain (in part) dependent on 
their accountability to their people for their legitimacy, relevance and use.  To deny rural 
people the ability to choose whether or not to attend customary courts is to undermine a 
significant aspect of their ability to secure their own justice and hold their institutions 
accountable. 
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ii. What are the Implications of What We Know for the Regulatory Framework that 
the Traditional Courts Bill Adopts? 
 
By refusing people the right to opt out of customary courts, and use the civil courts that all 
other South Africans are permitted to use as an alternative, the TCB strips rural people of 
several rights and benefits.  
 
First, it deprives them of their right to freely choose to associate with their traditional 
authorities.  Second, it denies them an escape from illegitimate and/or dysfunctional and 
unjust customary courts (where these are the conditions of their local courts).  And, third, it 
refuses them one of their instruments for holding these institutions accountable. 
 
 
2. Specific recommendations for alternative framework 
 
(i) Primarily, a fundamental shift of assumptions is necessary. 
 
a. As socially embedded and non-professional forums of dispute resolution, 
customary courts are constructed from the ground up.  Therefore, a system 
for their regulation should not focus at the chief’s level, or even begin 
from the chief’s court’s level and devolve authority downwards.  Rather, it 
should start from the intra-community levels and predominantly rely on 
community members to assign authority upwards, most obviously by 
referring their cases upwards.   
 
b. Customary courts are elective structures and should not be frozen or 
imposed by the state.  People should be enabled to choose to support and 
perpetuate them or cause their discontinuation by their withdrawal of their 
recognition of them as legitimate – that is, their withdrawal of their cases 
from them.   
 
c. The above two points necessitate the following: 
 
i. Local courts should be recognised first, before recognising 
community-level courts.  These courts include family/clan courts, 
ward/village courts and any other (even typically non-customary) 
courts that communities elect to form to meet their dispute 
resolution needs at the local level.   
 
ii. Provision should then be made for communities to refer cases up to 
courts at higher levels of formation within their communities, if 
they wish.   
 
iii. Similar provision must be made for people to refer cases outwards 
to courts that are external to their communities, if they wish.  In 
other words, if they elect to do so, community members should be 
able to take their cases from the headmen’s courts directly to the 
Magistrate’s Court. 
 
iv. People should be able to choose which customary court to 
patronise.  In practice, they might most often choose their local 
courts.  However, in some cases, they might choose a customary or 
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other informal court outside of the boundaries established by 
apartheid.  People should not be forcibly confined to using the 
courts of officially recognised chiefs (or headmen)  where they 
dispute the legitimacy of that chief, or the tribal boundaries 
inherited from apartheid and entrenched by the TLGFA.12 
 
v. Rural people should also be able to institute proceedings in outside 
courts and avoid customary courts entirely.13  This is most 
important in the case of criminal matters, where the only way that 
the denial of the right to legal representation14 can be justified in 
terms of the Constitution is if people choose to attend the 
customary court in which they are not permitted to have 
professional legal representation, and thus voluntarily abandon 
this right.15 
 
vi. Discrimination by the customary courts against any member of the 
community (whether on the basis of gender, culture, class, 
legitimacy, or even on the basis of non-payment of tribal levies and 
fees) should be outlawed. 
 
(ii) Community participation in cases should be recognised in both forms in which it 
generally occurs: through a council and through the general participation of the 
community.  The precise balance between the two (the council and the 
community) should be determined on the basis of each community’s own living 
customary law.  Women must be made a necessary part of the composition of the 
courts, and thus given an explicit role in decision-making concerning the content 
of customary law. 
 
(iii) As above, women’s involvement in courts must not be confined to their 
approaching courts as litigants.  However, where women are considered as 
litigants, the following must be provided for. 
 
a. Legislation must explicitly provide women with the right to represent 
themselves in customary courts.  Matters concerning the rights and 
interests of women must not be heard in the litigant women’s absences.  
Even where women wish to be assisted by family or friends, they must be 
present and able to speak at all times and, especially, their defences.   
                                                
12 With choice, the question arises as to who gets to make it: the plaintiff or defendant.  Legislation should 
possibly provide that, in civil cases, the plaintiff makes the choice by where they initiate proceedings (reserving 
room and a mechanism for the defendant to object), whilst in criminal cases, the accused should be permitted to 
make the choice. 
13 A further justification for people’s being able to choose to use the Magistrate’s Court as against the customary 
court is that this would do away with the difficulty created by the TCB, for women especially, in requiring them 
to challenge the chief as presiding officer directly if they feel that his judgment is unfair.  People can, instead, 
just avoid the chief entirely, which subtly says that they think him and his court incompetent/dysfunctional or 
biased/malicious, but this means does not require direct confrontation between people of unequal power, 
influence and means. 
14 Section 35(3)(f) gives people the right to legal representation where accused of an offence, and sections 7, 8 
and 36 all make the Bill of Rights central to our democracy, subject all laws to it and make it only limitable for 
constitutionally-compelling reasons.  Notably, section 35(3)(f) is a non-derogable right even in a state of 
emergency. 
15 See the discussion above, concerning sections 34 and 166(e). 
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b. Matters concerning issues affecting women adversely should be excluded 
from customary courts’ jurisdiction.  We recognise that this is a 
complicated issue and therefore recommend that the specific list of subject 
matter to be excluded be debated among stakeholders – and especially 
women themselves. 
 
(iv) Regarding sanctions, the following restrictions should be put in place. 
 
a. Orders of community service should be prohibited from being imposed on 
people not party to the proceedings.  These kinds of orders should be 
specifically prohibited from being interpreted to mean service in the chief 
or headman’s homestead or for the chief or headman’s benefit. 
 
b. Banishment or denial of land rights or community membership, and other 
customary rights, should be outlawed as punishments in both criminal and 
civil cases.  Corporal punishment and other forms of humiliating 
punishment should obviously also be prohibited. 
 
c. Orders of a monetary value must be restricted to modest sums that are in 
reasonable proportion with people’s income levels (and the common lack 
of income) in rural areas. 
 
d. Because of the importance (for community members) of victim 
compensation in the case of a wrong – even a criminal wrong – two things 
should be done.  First, compensation orders in criminal matters (that is, not 
as a separate civil claim but in the process of the sentencing in a criminal 
matter in terms of sections 297 and 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977) should be broadly publicised to the rural public, and made 
available to rural claimants via both the civil and customary courts.  
Second, customary courts should have jurisdiction as an alternative forum 
for civil claims in connection to minor criminal cases within their 
jurisdiction, where the criminal courts have not granted compensation 
orders.  This acknowledges the void that customary courts often end up 
filling by hearing ‘criminal matters’ as essentially civil claims. 
 
e. All customary court decisions and sanctions should be appealable to the 
Magistrate’s Court. 
 
(v) Rights, resources and oversight are essential to ensure that, where they are not, 
customary courts are developed into more functional and constitutionally just 
institutions that truly serve the justice needs of their communities.  This does not 
mean trying to make customary courts into Magistrate’s Courts.  Rather, it 
requires permitting them to operate in their contexts as they are inclined to whilst 
subjecting them firmly to the requirements of the Constitution, where they stray, 
and hence demanding that they conform to it and not undermine people’s rights.   
 
a. Government should provide them with the financial support to enable them 
to operate well.16  Certainly, poor people should not be required to pay 
                                                
16 Because customary courts are typically non-professional institutions, their financial needs would be different 
from those of state courts.  For instance, government should ideally provide a meal at the end to those who have 
participated in a day’s court proceedings, as this is one of the costs toward which people’s fines are often 
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(excessive sums) in order to ensure this or because of government’s failure 
to secure this.  An example is court fees and fines that, in some places, 
have crept up to prohibitory levels (and are even accompanied by 
unconventional gifts on the sides) and therefore make it difficult for poor 
people to access the courts and create an obstacle to justice.  Rural people 
should not have to pay for access to these forums of justice.  But if it 
proved necessary that they do, these fees should be nominal and 
consistent.  Court finances should be formally accounted for. 
 
b. Government should also fully familiarise itself with how the customary 
courts operate and guard that they operate in full recognition of 
constitutional rights and in accordance with constitutional values.  A 
desirable mechanism for this would be a dedicated department in the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development with trained 
officers to evaluate them and their reports.  (Only basic reporting is 
necessary or possible at this stage but this must definitely include accurate 
financial reporting.)  This department should conduct site visits as a form 
of oversight, assessment, modification and training that would allow for 
course corrections to be made specifically and timeously.  The department 
must also receive, investigate and deal with (anonymous) complaints 
pertaining to violations in specific courts. 
 
c. Sanctions must exist for customary courts that refuse to conform.  These 
should be over and above the sanction presumed above (namely, in that 
people would choose to cease to patronise a dysfunctional and unjust 
customary court).  Removal, prosecution, fining and imprisonment of 
recalcitrant customary court staff and regular participants should also be 
available sanctions against the institution and its servants.  Where 
problems with a customary court are systemic and irreparable, the 
withdrawal of recognition (i.e. official disestablishment) should also be 
possible.  However, this too should ultimately be guided by the will of the 
community that the court serves and be supported by the active facilitation 
of the community’s use of alternatives; otherwise, it will be ineffectual.  
Enforcement of these sanctions must be ensured when necessary or 
disillusionment with government’s preparedness to hold traditional 
institutions accountable will only grow. 
 
d. In the Magistrate’s Court, dedicated officers should be instated to deal 
with customary law concerns (original applications and appeals).  Training 
should be provided to them to deal with these matters with real 
understanding of the local systems with which they may be presented in 
their areas and give effect to (or, where necessary, develop in line with the 
Constitution) living customary law.  In other words, for the integration of 
customary courts with the state court system, mutual understanding and 
ongoing communication is required between the respective institutions.  
                                                                                                                                                  
attributed.  In many areas, government already provides modest stipends to headmen, councillors and 
secretaries, as the people who administratively staff the courts – but only at the chief’s court level.  As a 
consequence, many other servants of these courts are often left out e.g. the ‘traditional police’ (somewhat 
comparable to the ‘sheriff of the court’) who, in some instances, does the bulk of the running around for 
summoning people to the court and enforcing judgments, as well as sometimes even hearing cases and 
intervening in physical/violent disputes.   
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Mutual change and development to accommodate and learn from one 
another is indispensible. 
 
(vi) Summary of Principles: 
 
Regulation of customary courts should be minimalist and – 
a. Lighter on assigning power to traditional institutions, 
b. Heavier on assigning them responsibility and rather emphasise the limits 
of the powers that traditional institutions might assume to have (in light of 
colonial and apartheid entitlements), and, 
c. Provide for their accountability directly to the communities they serve 
first, and to the state second.  This means making their existence 
dependent on their effectively fulfilling this requirement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, our argument is that the current Bill is fatally flawed and should be withdrawn, 
and a proper consultation process embarked on to ascertain the views and experiences of a 
proper cross-section of ordinary rural people, paying particular care to enable rural women to 
participate fully.  Moreover since the subject matter of the Bill is Traditional Courts, the 
consultation process should focus on existing customary dispute resolution processes and 
how these work in practice; seeking ways to enhance and improve the delivery of justice to 
those who use them.  This important objective should not be made secondary to the demands 
of traditional leaders for increased powers.  The starting point for legislative reform 
concerning customary law must be living customary law, not the distorted precedents 
established and entrenched by previous colonial and apartheid laws. 
 
